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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040595-CA

vs.
RICHARD KENNETH LAMBETH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
it J? &

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2003), and one count of
disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102
(2003), in the Second District Court, Weber County, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West
2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
May defendant challenge the lawfulness of a search incident to arrest by
claiming that the statute under which the arrest occurred is unconstitutional?
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on the validity of a search or seizure as a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95 ^ 15, 512 Utah Adv. Rep.
49. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a deferential clearly erroneous
standard.

Id.

The court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, without

deference to the trial court. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This case requires the interpretation and application of the following constitutional
provisions and statutes:
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article 1, Section 14, Utah Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (2003)
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move
from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically
offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening
behavior;
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place;
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard
in a public place; or
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to
which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and
includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities,
and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues
after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 19, 2003, the State charged defendant with one count of possession
of a controlled substance and one count of disorderly conduct (R. 1). Defendant moved
to suppress evidence of his possession of methamphetamine as the fruit of an illegal
arrest (R. 29-30). He claimed that no offense occurred because the disorderly conduct
statute under which he was arrested was unconstitutional (R. 24-25, 26). He concluded
that because no offense occurred, there was no probable cause to arrest, and therefore the
search incident to arrest during which the methamphetamine was discovered was
unlawful (R. 25, 27). A suppression hearing was held after which the court denied
defendant's motion (R. 42; 69.28). It found that defendant intentionally caused public
alarm by making unreasonable noises (R. 43-44; 69:28).

The court ruled that

defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of the disorderly conduct statute and that his
conduct was not protected by the First Amendment (R. 44; 69:28).
Defendant entered a Sery plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress (R. 48). In exchange for the plea, the state reduced count one from a second
degree felony to a third degree felony (R. 52). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent
terms of zero to five years in prison for possession of a controlled substance, and ninetydays in jail for disorderly conduct (R. 55). Defendant timely appealed (R. 58).

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On Thursday December 18th, 2003, Sergeant McAllister and Detective Hanson of
the Ogden Police Department went to a 7-Eleven in downtown Ogden to get a drink and a
donut (R. 69:5). As they walked toward the 7-Eleven entrance, they heard someone
loudly yell, "fucking pigs!" (R. 69:5, 6). They turned toward the gas pumps and saw
defendant, whom they both recognized from prior dealings (R. 69:6-7).
Defendant was 60 or 70 feet away from the officers, but "there was no difficulty in
hearing" what he said because defendant was yelling "extremely loud[ly]" (R. 69:7-8).
When he turned to look at defendant, Sergeant McAllister noticed a lady near defendant
pumping gas into a van occupied by several small children (R. 69:8-9). This lady's "eyes
got big and she seemed to hurry and finish pumping her gas" (R. 69:9). Hoping to avoid
an unnecessary confrontation, Sergeant McAllister told Detective Hanson, "let's just
ignore him," and they continued walking toward the front doors of the 7-11 (R. 69:9). As
they reached the doors, defendant yelled, "extremely loud[ly], even louder than the first"
time, "suck my dick!" (R. 69:9).
When defendant yelled the second time, Sergeant McAllister noticed that the
woman at the pump "hurried and got in and drove away," presumably "to get herself and
her kids away from him" (R. 69:9). Sergeant McAllister told defendant, "Richard, you
better stop" (R. 69:9). Immediately after warning defendant, two ladies walked toward
the front doors of the 7-11 (R. 69:11). Sergeant McAllister opened the door for them to

1

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 2, 12 P.3d 92.
4

walk out, and as they did defendant yelled "flick" just as loud as he had yelled "suck my
dick" (R. 69:11). The ladies were "shocked," and "their eyes got kind of wide" (R.
69:11). They were "hesitant to come out" of the 7-11, because "[t]hey were like, what's
going on out here" (R. 69:11).
At this point Sergeant McAllister decided to talk to defendant and began to walk
towards him (R. 69:12). Defendant continued to loudly yell at Sergeant McAllister (R.
69:12). Sergeant McAllister then arrested defendant for disorderly conduct (R. 69:1213). During the search incident to the arrest, officers found two baggies containing
methamphetamine residue (R. 35).
After the arrest, defendant requested to speak with Sergeant McAllister (R. 69:1819). Sergeant McAllister went over to the patrol car where defendant was handcuffed (R.
69:19). Defendant apologized for "calling [the officers] fucking pigs and for yelling" (R.
69:19). Sergeant McAllister responded, "not just me, who did you affect?" (R. 69:19).
Defendant admitted, "the people around" (R. 69:19).
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the
search incident to arrest, the court found that (1) the officers were able to hear defendant
yelling from over seventy feet away; (2) the patrons of the 7-Eleven appeared to be
disturbed by defendant's conduct; (3) the women pumping gas near defendant was
justifiably alarmed by his conduct; and (4) "Although the Defendant used profanity, it
was not the content of the dialogue, it was the manner and tone in which said the
statements that triggered the statute" (R. 42-44). From its findings, the court ruled that
defendant made unreasonable noise in a public place with the intent to cause
5

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm and that defendant's conduct was not protected by
the First Amendment (R. 44).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant may not challenge the validity of a search incident to arrest by claiming
that the statute under which the arrest was made is unconstitutional. An arrest supported
by probable cause is valid despite a later judicial determination that the statute
authorizing the arrest is unconstitutional. The only exception to this rule is for statutes
that are so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that a person of reasonable prudence
would be bound to see its flaws.
Defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause to believe he was guilty of
disorderly conduct. Moreover, Utah's disorderly conduct statute is a content-neutral
time, place, and manner restriction. It is similar to several other state disorderly conduct
statutes that have been upheld against First Amendment and vagueness challenges. The
statute is not therefore so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST BY CLAIMING THAT THE
STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE ARREST OCCURRED IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
Specifically,

defendant

claims that because the disorderly conduct statute is

unconstitutional, defendant "did not commit a criminal offense and the officers did not

6

have probable cause to arrest him." Br. Aplt. at 17-18. Defendant further contends that
because the officers had no probable cause to arrest, all evidence obtained must be
suppressed. Br. Aplt. at 18. Defendant's argument fails because it relies on the erroneous
premise that an arrest is unlawful if it is made pursuant to a statute that is later held
unconstitutional.
A. Finding that a statute is unconstitutional does not invalidate a prior
arrest made under the statute.
It is well settled that "[a] stop or arrest made pursuant to an officer's . . . reliance
on an ordinance not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a subsequent
judicial determination of its unconstitutionality." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452
(Utah 1996); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (holding that Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police who acted
in objectively reasonable reliance upon statute authorizing warrantless administrative
searches, even though statute was later held unconstitutional); Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979) (holding that where officer who arrested defendant had abundant
probable cause to believe defendant's conduct in refusing to identify himself violated city
ordinance, the arrest of defendant was lawful even though the city ordinance was later
declared unconstitutional); Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 365 n.4 (1998) (noting that exclusionary rule does not apply "when the officer
reasonably relied on a statute later deemed unconstitutional"); United States v. Vanness,
342 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[i]n this analysis we do not decide
the constitutionality of the ordinance, but merely that it was objectively reasonable for the

7

officers to rely on the noise ordinance"). This rule exists because the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action. See DeFillippo, AA3 U.S. at 38 n.3.
"No conceivable purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which,
at the time it was found on the person of the respondent, was the product of a lawful
arrest and a lawful search." Id.
The only exception to this rule is when the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws."
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted); see also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38. In
such a case, police are expected, like the rest of society, to realize that the statute is
unconstitutional and act accordingly.
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996) controls this case. Police found
Chapman parked in an otherwise empty school parking lot late at night. 921 P.2d at 448.
A Salt Lake County ordinance prohibited anyone from loitering on school grounds
without a lawful purpose. Id. at 449. Police arrested Chapman and found a stolen gun in
the vehicle. Id. at 448-49. The State charged Chapman with burglary. Id. at 449.
Chapman claimed, as did defendant in the instant case, that because the anti-loitering
ordinance was unconstitutional, the arrest and search incident thereto were unlawful and
the evidence must be suppressed. Id. at 451.
The Utah Supreme Court declared, "we hold that the officers were entitled to rely
upon the ordinance." Id. at 451 n.9. The court further reasoned that, "'[p]olice are
charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.

The

enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its
8

constitutionality

'" Id. at 451-452 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38).

The court affirmed the denial of Chapman's motion to suppress and did not reach the
merits of his constitutional claim. Id. at451n.9.
The instant case is analogous to Chapman in all material respects. Like Chapman,
defendant was arrested for committing a class C misdemeanor in the officers' presence
(R. 69:12-13). A search was conducted incident to the arrest revealing evidence giving
rise to additional charges (R. 35). Like Chapman, defendant now claims the arrest and
the search incident thereto were unlawful because the statute under which the arrest was
made is unconstitutional (R. 25-27). This Court should therefore disregard defendant's
constitutional challenge and affirm his conviction because the officers had probable cause
to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct, and the disorderly conduct statute is not "so
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be
bound to see its flaws." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted); see also State v.
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App. 1996) ("Utah courts have consistently refused to
reach the constitutionality of a statute when there are other independent grounds to
resolve the case.").
B. Police had probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly
conduct
Defendant has never challenged the trial court's conclusion that police had
probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct, except to claim that the statute is
unconstitutional and therefore no offense occurred (R. 24-26). See Br. Aplt. at 7-8.
Moreover, by pleading guilty to disorderly conduct, defendant has admitted that his

9

outburst at 7-Eleven satisfied the elements of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-132(2) (2003) ("A plea of guilty is an acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged."); Utah R. Crim P. 11(e)(4) (requiring plea-taking court to inform
defendant that plea of guilty is an admission to all elements of crime). This Court may
therefore find, based on defendant's guilty plea and his failure to raise the issue before
the trial court or this Court, that defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of the statute
and that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct.
A review of the evidence at the suppression reveals that police did indeed have
probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct. Probable cause exists if "at the
moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within (the arresting
officer's) knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
(suspect) had committed or was committing an offense." United States v. Gagnon, 635
F.2d 766, 769 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)), cert,
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981). A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he "makes
unreasonable noises in a public place" with the intent "to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creat[es] a risk thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102.
In this case, Officer McAllister heard defendant yelling loudly from seventy feet
away (R. 42; 69:7-8). He observed three ladies and several children become alarmed as
defendant yelled (R. 43; 69:6-7, 9-12). Officer McAllister noticed that the lady closest to
defendant "hurried and got in and drove away . . . to get herself and her kids away from
him" (R. 43; 69:9). The trial court found that these people were "justifiably alarmed by
defendant's conduct" (R. 43). Officer McAllister made these observations himself and
10

thus "the facts and circumstances within [his] knowledge" were "at the moment [of] the
arrest" sufficient to lead Officer McAllister believe defendant was committing an offense.
Gagnon, 635 F.2d at 769.
C. Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be
bound to see its flaws; in fact, Utah's disorderly conduct statute is
not unconstitutional under any standard.
Defendant did not argue in the trial court or to this Court that the disorderly
conduct statute is so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable
prudence would be bound to see its flaws. He merely asserts, without analysis or citation
to authority, that a "reasonably objective police officer should understand fundamental
constitutional law and recognize that the Defendant's speech is constitutionally
protected."

Br. Aplt. at 19.

His failure to address the appropriate standard and

adequately brief the Court on this crucial issue should foreclose any further
consideration. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellate briefs to contain "the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented" and
"citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44,16, 1 P.3d 1108 (noting that court is not a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments
that are not adequately briefed."). Even if defendant had cited and argued the appropriate
standard of constitutionality, his claim would still fail because Utah's disorderly conduct
statute is not so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable

11

prudence would be bound to see its flaws. In fact, the statute withstands constitutional
scrutiny under any standard.
Defendant asserts that the disorderly conduct statute is unconstitutional because it
is overbroad and vague. Br. Aplt. at 12. He also asserts that, as applied to him, the
statute "infringed on his protected speech" and failed to give him notice that his conduct
violated the statute. Br. Aplt. at 13, 16.
1. The statute is not overbroad and did not infringe on defendant's
protected speech because it is a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction.
The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth applies to statutes "that are written
so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties."
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 798, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 (1984). Statutory overbreadth "is a substantive due
process question which addresses the issue of whether 'the statute is so broad that it may
not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit protected activity as well.'"
State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted). "The overbreadth
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, 'from the text of [the law] and from actual
fact,' that substantial overbreadth exists." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003)
(quoting New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York 487 U.S. 1, 14, (1988)).

2

Even if this Court were to find the statute unconstitutional under the standard used in a
direct attack on the statute, the remedy would be to vacate defendant's conviction for
disorderly conduct only. Defendant's conviction for methamphetamine possession must
stand unless the Court holds the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that
any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws." Chapman, 921 P.2d
at 452 (emphasis omitted).
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"[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views
at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired." Heffron v. International
Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). "[E]ven in a public
forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); International
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. at 648. These restrictions need only be
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech" and be "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest."
Violence, 468 U.S. at 293.

Community for Creative Non-

Utah's disorderly conduct statute meets both of these

requirements and therefore is not so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any
person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.
Utah's disorderly conduct statute prohibits "makfing] unreasonable noises in a
public place" with the intent "to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly creat[e] a risk thereof.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102.

It does not

discriminate against the content of speech, but rather, it applies to any speech that reaches
an unreasonable level of noise and that is made with intent to annoy or alarm the public.
Vulgar speech, political speech, commercial speech, and even non-verbal noises such as
heavy machinery or automobiles are all equally subject to restrictions on their volume
level without regard to their content. The statute is therefore justified without reference
to the content of any sound it regulates because its purpose is to protect the public from
unwanted noise, not to control speech. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 ("A
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regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.5').
The statute also is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
"[I]t can no longer be doubted that government 'ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting
its citizens from unwelcome noise.9" Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 796 (quoting
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 806). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
there is a "significant difference between state restrictions on a speaker's right to address
a willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted communication." Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-16 (2000). The instant statute fits within the latter
category. Its purpose is to protect "'the right to be let alone,'" which is "'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized [people].'" Id. at 716-17
(quoting Olmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
Utah's disorderly conduct statute is narrowly tailored to effectuate

the

government's interest because the requirement that the noise be both unreasonable and
made with intent to inconvenience, annoy, or alarm the public prevents the statute from
burdening protected speech. The statute permits an individual to say whatever he pleases
and requires only that the speaker exercise reason in his choice of time, place, and
manner. Only' speech that has no legitimate purpose and that intrudes on the right of
others "to be let alone" will satisfy the elements of the disorderly conduct statute. Hill,
530 U.S. at 716.
Nor does Utah's disorderly conduct statute violate the First Amendment as applied
to defendant. Defendant was arrested and convicted not because of what he said, but how
14

he said it and the intent with which he said it. The trial court expressly found, "Although
the Defendant used profanity, it was not the content of the dialogue, it was the manner
and tone in which he said the statements that triggered the statute" (R. 44). The record
supports the court's finding. Officer's testified that defendant was yelling "extremely
loud[ly]" and could be clearly heard from seventy feet away (R. 69:7-9). Defendant's
yelling caused visible alarm to the people patronizing the 7-Eleven (R. 69:8-9, 11). It
was also apparently unprovoked (R. 69:5-7). These facts demonstrate that defendant was
not arrested for using vulgar language, but rather, he was arrested for an unreasonably
loud, unprovoked outburst that alarmed those around him and disrupted 7-Eleven's
business.
Defendant relies on Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990) for his
claim that the disorderly conduct statute is overbroad and infringed on his First
Amendment rights. Br. Aplt. at 7-8. Huber is distinguishable from the instant case.
Huber was stopped by police in the early morning hours in front of his business on
suspicion a traffic violation. Id. at 1373. During the stop, Huber raised his voice to
officers and used coarse and vulgar language to demonstrate his displeasure at their
stopping him. Id. at 1373-74. The officers arrested defendant for disorderly conduct. Id.
at 1374. A jury convicted him of violation of "a municipal ordinance that renders a
person guilty of disorderly conduct if, [i]ntending to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: . . . (D) He engages in abusive
or obscene language or makes obscene gestures in a public place.'" Id. (quoting Logan
City, Utah, Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) (Feb. 19, 1987)).
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On appeal, Huber challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague. Id. at 1375. This Court determined that the municipal ordinance criminalized
speech and that it could only withstand a First Amendment challenge if the speech it
regulated fell within the "fighting words" exception to the First Amendment. Id. at
1374-75. This Court then held that the word "abusive" gave the statute far greater reach
than just "fighting words." Id. at 1375. It also held that the intent language did not
narrow the application of "abusive" to only fighting words, but rather, permitted abusive
language to be punished if it was only annoying or alarming. Id. The Court also declined
to give the ordinance a narrowing construction to avoid a constitutional defect because to
do so would require rewriting the ordinance. Id. at 1376-77.
The statute in the instant case is distinguishable from the statute in Huber because
it does not punish any particular category of speech. It only regulates the time, place, and
manner in which people engage in speech. Unlike the ordinance in Huber, the instant
statute does not rely on the fighting words exception to regulate the content of speech. It
merely proscribes speech that, like any other annoying or alarming sound, intrudes on the
right of others to be free from unwelcome noise. See Hill, 530, U.S. at 715-16 (noting
that government may protect "'the right to be let alone,'" which is "'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized [people]" (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)). It matters not whether a person is
blowing an air horn or yelling the Pledge of Allegiance at the top of his lungs. If his
noise level is unreasonable for the circumstances and is made with intent to
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inconvenience, annoy, or alarm the public, the government may restrict it without
offending the First Amendment. See id.
The facts of Huber are also distinguishable from the instant case. There is no
indication in Huber that Huber's speech reached the level of unreasonable noise. Huber
was stopped in the early hours of the morning in front of his own business. Huber, 786
P.2d at 1373. The only people apparently involved were Huber and the two police
officers, and they were on Huber's private property. Id. (noting that stop occurred in
parking lot of defendant's business as he walking toward door of his building). Huber
raised his voice, but there is no evidence that his speech reached the level of an
unreasonable noise, given the location and the hour. Id. There is also no indication that
Huber intended to alarm or annoy anyone except the two police officers, who are
expected to tolerate some criticism. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63
(1987) (noting that individuals are free to oppose or challenge police action without fear
of arrest). In contrast, the trial court found that defendant's noise level was unreasonable
under the circumstances and that he did intend to annoy or alarm the other patrons of the
7-Eleven besides the police officers (R. 43-44). Unlike Huber, defendant was not arrest
for swearing at the officers—he was arrested for yelling unreasonably in a way that
disrupted 7-Eleven's business and alarmed its customers. Defendant may not cloak his
disruptive conduct with protections of the First Amendment merely because he was using
vulgar language. The First Amendment permits defendant to voice his criticisms to the
officers at a reasonable, conversational volume level that does not disrupt 7-Eleven's
business and alarm its patrons. He may not do it, however, in manner that alarms the
17

public and intrudes on their right to be free from unwelcome noise. See Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. at 796.
Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not overbroad. That, however, is not the
question before this Court. Defendant can only prevail if the statue is "so grossly and
flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see
its flaws." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions in a variety of settings. See
Hill v. Colorado, 530, U.S. 703, 730-32 (2000) (upholding statute that prohibited any
person within 100 feet of a healthcare facility from knowingly approaching within eight
feet of another person, without that person's consent, to engage in written or oral protest,
education, or counseling); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989)
(upholding ordinance that required performers in Central Park amphitheater in to use
sound system and engineers provided by city in order to control volume of performance);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (upholding statute preventing picketing
before or about a residence or dwelling); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (upholding ordinance that prohibited
soliciting at state fair outside of designated areas). Moreover, at least two states have
upheld against overbreadth challenges disorderly conducts statutes that mirror the
language of Utah's statute. See Sterling v. State, 701 So.2d 71, 73-74 (Ala. Crim. App.
1997); People v. Bakolas, 449 N.E.2d 738, 741 (N.Y. 1983). Thus, a person, including a
police officer, questioning the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute would
find that the Supreme Court generally upholds statutes that only restrict the time, place,
18

and manner of speech, and that other state's have upheld statutes similar to Utah's.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws."
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38.
2. Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not unconstitutionally vague
on its face or as applied to defendant.
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Vagueness claims,

therefore, "'are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute
adequately notices the proscribed conduct.'" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^f 14, 84
P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987)). "If a statute
'"is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited,"' it is
not unconstitutionally vague." Id. (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92) (quoting State
v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)).
"'[Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional,' and those who
challenge a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 42, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Greenwood
v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); see also U.S v. Welch, 327
F.3d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that when statutes are challenged for vagueness
"courts begin with the presumption that the statute" is constitutional and '"must be
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upheld unless satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature went beyond the
confines of the Constitution'" (quoting United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1004 (10th
Cir. 2001))). The presumption of constitutionality is especially strong when the statute
has a mens rea requirement See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) ("This
Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.").
Because Utah's statute only punishes those "intending to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof," the presumption of
constitutionality is especially strong.
Defendant asserts that the statute is vague because it fails to define the term
"unreasonable noise." Br. Aplt. at 16. There is nothing vague or ambiguous about that
term. The common meaning of the word "noise" is a "loud, confused, or senseless
shouting or outcry" or "any sound that is undesired or interferes with ones hearing of
something." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1533 (3d ed. 1993). By simple
reference to a dictionary, both law enforcement and citizens can readily determine
whether a particular sound is "noise."
The word "unreasonable" is also easily construed. "The word unreasonable is
often used in the law, and is commonly defined as: not conformable to reason, irrational,
not governed or influenced by reason, immoderate, excessive, exorbitant, foolish, unwise,
absurd, silly, preposterous, senseless and stupid" State v. Marker, 536 P.2d 1273, 127576 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). According to the the New York Court of Appeals, "[T]he term
'unreasonable noise' is not incapable of definition. Rather, it describes a noise of a type
20
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Moreover, a federal disorderly conduct regulation and over a dozen state
disorderly conduct statutes use the language "unreasonable noise." See Ala. Code § 13AI I • ; (20 34 ); \k i« il a i Stat § 11 51 11 3 (I lichie 200 1); Call I '"eiial Code § 115 ( Vv c , ;t
2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-106 (West 2005); Conn. Gen Stat »|,: i :
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§ 53a-182

(West 2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1101 (Michie 2003); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-451-3) (West 2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.060 (West 2004); M.D. Code Ann,
Criminal Law § 10-201 (2004); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:2 (2004); N.Y. Penal Law §
240.20 (McKinney 2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.11 (West 2004); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 5503 (West 2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-13-1 (Michie 2004); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-17-305 (2004); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01 (Vernon 2004); 13 Vt.
Stat. Ann. § 1026 (2004); 36 C.F.R. § 2.34. At least four states and the District of
Columbia have disorderly conduct statutes that prohibit a person from making loud
noises, but use terms other than "unreasonable" noise. See 2003 111. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93431 (H.B. 2902) (amending 720 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/26-1); Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann.
272 § 53 (West 2004) (prohibiting "persons who with offensive . . . language accost or
annoy persons"); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.72 (West 2004) (prohibiting "boisterous or
noisy conduct"); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C: 33-2 (2004) (prohibiting "loud and offensive
language"); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1321 (2004) (prohibiting "shout[ing] or mak[ing] a
noise . . . to the annoyance or disturbance" of others); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.01 (West
2004) (prohibiting "unreasonably loud" conduct).
Against this background, Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not "so grossly and
flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see
its flaws." DeFillippo, AA3 U.S. at 38. Moreover, ordinary people and law enforcement
would understand that yelling vulgarities at police officers without reason or provocation
in the parking lot of a convenience store constitutes unreasonable noise and creates a
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substantial risk that others in the parking lot will be alarmed. This is especially true when
the yelling evokes a visible reaction of alarm from the other patrons of the store (R. 69:9).
• CONCI I ISION •
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Plaintiff,
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Judge Roger S. Dutson $£ft «

Defendant.
; This Court hereby denies the Defendant's MXK-P ' ^
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''' •• • <'". •• r r.-ji.-,-s i^e

following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On December 18, 2003 at approximately 3:45 p.m., Sergeant Chris McAllister ("Sgt.
McAllister") and Detective Tony Hanson ("Det. Hanson") parked their vehicles on the
I" LIS LSI Liv v'i

MJVcL.

As Sgt. McAllister and Det, Hanson were walking toward the entrance of 7-11, they^gard the
Defendani v-M - n- -king iVs!"
3.

Det. Hanson said to Sgt. McAllister, "Isn't that Richard Lambeth?" Sgt. McAllister looked
toward the Defendant who was standing near tlu v?s pin--p^ ••• ^p wimat Jv 7^ fV,>* •. v. MV T T .
recognized the Defendant as a person he had met on various other occasions.

1
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4.

A woman and her children were nearby when the Defendant began to yell. The woman was
in the process of pumping gas into a mini-van. The woman's eyes grew larger and she
seemed to hurry her activities.

5.

Sgt. McAllister and Det. Hanson ignored the Defendant and continued walking toward the
entrance of the store.

6.

Again, in a louder voice, the Defendant yelled at the officers. This time the Defendant
hollered, "Suck my Dick!"

7.

Sgt. McAllister asked the Defendant to stop yelling, and the Defendant yelled back loudly,
"Fuck!"

8.

As the Defendant was yelling, two ladies were walking out of 7-11. These patrons appeared to
be disturbed by the Defendant's conduct.

9.

Sgt. McAllister decided to place the Defendant under arrest for disorderly conduct.

10.

He called another officer to transport the Defendant.

11.

The Defendant asked to speak to Sgt. McAllister. When Sgt. McAllister finally relented and
went to the car where the Defendant was sitting, the Defendant apologized for yelling at the
officers.

12.

The convenience store parking lot is a public place.

13.

The women and children in the nearby vicinity of the Defendant were justifiably alarmed by
the Defendant's conduct.

2
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1 1-

•!: '. ••„ ,: •• c i^L'icnuaiiL usee prolyl!-y. n ••* a.s not the content of the dialogue, it was the
manner and tone in which he said the statements that triggered the statute.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

'ire Defendant's nmdiirl fills wiihlit llir pn w i ,iun nf tin* DI,.I Htlciiy Conduct statute* lliut
reads, the Defendant "intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly created a risk thereof (ii) made unreasonable noises in a pi iblic place."

2

ie Defendant's conduct was not protected by the First Amendment freedom of speech
clause.
D k I ED this ^ ' i»f Febmasy, 2004

JUDGE^OGER S. DUTSON
Second Judicial District Court

Approved as to form:

BKENDA J. BEATQ
Deputy Weber County Attorney

MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS
Attorney for Defendant

044

